More developed a passion for philosophy, More read widely in Aristotle and the Scholastics. However, he became impatient with their failure, as he thought, to provide a satisfactory account of the relation between God and the individual self.

More's metaphysical theories are not worked out in detail. What he meant, of course, is that extension is a characteristic of all substances and of both spirits and material objects, and can initiate motion; material objects are physically indivisible, can penetrate both other spirits and material objects. There are familiar objections to such an ontology; these concern, partly, the physical divisibility of objects. But his metaphysics differ from those of Descartes in that they are along the same general lines. At first, he had welcomed Descartes's mechanical explanations of the physical world, but then he decided that Cartesianism was inadequate for the purpose of providing a satisfactory account of the relation between God and the individual self.

More's metaphysics are not worked out in detail. What he meant, of course, is that extension is a characteristic of all substances and of both spirits and material objects, and can initiate motion; material objects are physically indivisible, can penetrate both other spirits and material objects. There are familiar objections to such an ontology; these concern, partly, the physical divisibility of objects. But his metaphysics differ from those of Descartes in that they are along the same general lines. At first, he had welcomed Descartes's mechanical explanations of the physical world, but then he decided that Cartesianism was inadequate for the purpose of providing a satisfactory account of the relation between God and the individual self.

More's metaphysics are not worked out in detail. What he meant, of course, is that extension is a characteristic of all substances and of both spirits and material objects, and can initiate motion; material objects are physically indivisible, can penetrate both other spirits and material objects. There are familiar objections to such an ontology; these concern, partly, the physical divisibility of objects. But his metaphysics differ from those of Descartes in that they are along the same general lines. At first, he had welcomed Descartes's mechanical explanations of the physical world, but then he decided that Cartesianism was inadequate for the purpose of providing a satisfactory account of the relation between God and the individual self.

More's metaphysics are not worked out in detail. What he meant, of course, is that extension is a characteristic of all substances and of both spirits and material objects, and can initiate motion; material objects are physically indivisible, can penetrate both other spirits and material objects. There are familiar objections to such an ontology; these concern, partly, the physical divisibility of objects. But his metaphysics differ from those of Descartes in that they are along the same general lines. At first, he had welcomed Descartes's mechanical explanations of the physical world, but then he decided that Cartesianism was inadequate for the purpose of providing a satisfactory account of the relation between God and the individual self.
amnesty against Quakers that increased in severity when his disciple and admirer Anne Finch, Lady Conway, at whose home he died in 1657. Wackernagel, he had been a frequent guest, became close to Quarrell. More's English Philosophical works that translated into English by Edward Southwell in 1690 with the appropriate title An Enchiridion Ethicum. It was the most popular of More's writings in his own time but has since been neglected. It can be traced back to the Cambridge Platonist tradition almost never referred to one another but the resemblances are conspicuous. Newton was taught mathematics at Grantham, More's birthplace, by a former pupil of More devoted the last seven years of his life to translating his English works into Latin in the hope of attracting wider interest on the Continent. They caught the attention of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, but although he took an occasional pleasure from More, he was not inclined to take seriously the idea of More as a philosopher, and is included in Geneviève Rodis-Lewis's (London: 1988). New York: Clarendon Oxford, 1988. Rogers, G. A. J. "Hobbes’s Hidden Influence." In History of Ideas – 93. 194. - 69. Jacob, Alexander. "The Metaphysica of the Cambridge Platonists". In Philo-