The son of a printing worker who became a small entrepreneur, Paul Painlevé was accepted into the competition for the École normale supérieure. Graduated in physics and mathematics, soon aggregated and obtained a doctorate in this second discipline, professor at the Sorbonne and at the École Polytechnique, elected in 1900 to the Academy of Sciences, the brilliant scientist made himself known to the general public when he defended Alfred Dreyfus then supported the fledgling aviation.

Fine writer and talented speaker, he became deputy for Paris in 1910. Consistency marked his political career. For twenty-three years he sat in the House. A socialist republican rooted in the centre-left, he was an ally of the radicals. He established himself as a specialist in defence matters, on parliamentary committees and then as Minister of War and of Air. The responsibilities entrusted to him - minister fourteen times, three times President of the Council, also President of the Chamber - made him a consular figure of the Republic.

In 1914, at the head of the Higher Commission for Inventions, then in 1915 as Minister of Public Education, Fine Arts and Inventions of National Defence, Painlevé mobilised scientists and engineers responsible for inventing modern warfare. Chosen to be Minister of War in 1917, he could not prevent the offensive designed by Nivelle. His failure allowed him to appoint Pétain commander-in-chief. After giving him the means to repress the mutinies, he supported his "healing policy" intended to hold the army until the resumption of the major offensives planned for 1918. The year of the turning point of the war, Painlevé also organised the deployment of the American army, obtained the entry into war of Greece, engaged France at the side of Italy while it made instituted the Allied Superior War Council where Ferdinand Foch represented France.

In the immediate post-war period, at the head of the League of the Republic, he opposed the policy of the National Bloc and called on the left to unite. Along with Edouard Herriot and Léon Blum, he was a head of the Cartel. In 1925, his government lived at the time of the colonial crises (Rif, Syria and Lebanon) which he had suppressed, but also of the rapprochement with Germany (Locarno Accords, entry to the League of Nations). At the end of the 1920s, Painlevé carried out the major reforms of the French army (one-year service, Maginot line) and boosted the autonomy of the Air Force. During the last part of his life, he sharply denounced the rise of Nazism.

When parliamentarians voted for a national funeral and burial in the Pantheon, they saluted an original career. In fact, the scientist's long shadow had hovered over the politician's career. His status as a "great scientist", whom the press had been quick to promote, had been an advantage vis-à-vis the voters. Painlevé had also always claimed to apply the "scientific method" in politics. He had never stopped defending what he considered to be the interests of science.

1863 Birth in Paris.

1877-1883 Student at Lycée Louis-le-Grand.

1883-1886 Student of the École normale supérieure.

1886 Aggregation of mathematical sciences.

1886-1887 Stay at the University of Göttingen.

1887 Doctorate in mathematical sciences, lecturer at the Faculty of Sciences of Lille.

1890 Laureate of the Institute, Grand Prix in Mathematical Sciences.

1892 Lecturer at the Faculty of Science in Paris.

1894 Laureate of the Institute, Bordin Prize (mechanical).

1895 Assistant professor at the Faculty of Sciences of Paris.

1896 Analysis tutor at the École Polytechnique. Substitute professor at the Collège de France. Laureate of the Institute, Poncelet Prize (mathematics and mechanics).

1897 Senior lecturer at the École normale supérieure.

1898 Examiner at the École Polytechnique.

1899 Witness to the second Dreyfus court martial in Rennes.

1900 Member of the Academy of Sciences, Geometry Section .

1901 Marriage to Marguerite Petit de Villeneuve.

1902 Birth of Jean Painlevé; death of Marguerite Petit de Villeneuve.

1903 Full professor of general mathematics at the Faculty of Sciences in Paris.

1904 Member of the central committee of the League for Human Rights.

1905 Professor of rational mechanics and machines at the École Polytechnique.

1907 Chairman of the improvement council of the National Conservatory of Arts and Crafts. Chairman of the technical committee of the National Testing Laboratory. Member of the Paris Observatory board.

1908 Holder, by his flights with Wright and Farman, of the double record for the longest two-person flight and the flight on two different aircraft.

1909 Professor delivering the course in aviation mechanics at the Graduate School of Aeronautics. Chairman of the Air Navigation Commission of the Ministry of Public Works. Vice-president of the National Air League. Co-author of For Aviation and Triumphant Aviation.

1910 Member of the 5th arrondissement of Paris. Registration for the Socialist Republican Parliamentary Group. First intervention in public session of the Chamber of Deputies against the Briand government. With Émile Borel, publication of 'L'Aviation'.

1911 Founder of the Socialist Republican Party.

1914 Re-elected deputy for the 5th arrondissement of Paris. Member of the parliamentary commissions of the War and the Navy (president of the latter). De facto President of the Higher Commission for Inventions concerning National Defence.

1915 Minister of Public Instruction, Fine Arts and Inventions of National Defence in the Fifth Briand Cabinet (October 29, 1915 - December 11, 1916).

1917 Minister of War in the third Alexandre Ribot cabinet (March 20-September 11, 1917). Prime Minister Painlevé (13 September - 13 November 1917), Paul Painlevé Minister of War and President of the Council.

1919 President of the Academy of Sciences. Publication of 'La vérité sur l'offensive du 16 avril 1917. Member of Parliament for the 3rd district of the Seine.

1920 Travel to China and Indochina.

1921 Founder of the League of the Republic, speech from Avignon.

1923 Publication of 'Comment j'ai nommé Foch et Pétain'.

1924 Co-author of 'La politique républicaine'. Re-elected deputy of the 3rd district of the Seine. President of the Chamber of Deputies, candidate of the Left for the election of the President of the Republic.

1925 Second Painlevé ministry, Paul Painlevé Minister of War and President of the Council (17 April - 28 October 1925). Third Painlevé ministry, Paul Painlevé Minister of Finance and President of the Council (29 October - 22 November 1925). Honorary President of the Socialist Republican Party. President of the management committee of the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation.

1926-1929 Minister of War in the eighth (28 November 1925 - 6 March 1926) and the ninth (9 March 1926 - 15 June 1926) Briand cabinets, in the second Herriot cabinet (20-21 July 1926), in the fourth (23 July 1926 - 6 November 1928) and the fifth (11 November 1928 - 27 July 1929) Poincaré ministries, in the eleventh Briand ministry (29 July - 22 October 1929).

1928 Deputy for Ain, constituency of Nantua-Gex.

1930-1933 Minister of Air in the Steeg ministry (13 December 1930 - 22 January 1931), in the third Herriot ministry (3 June - 14 December 1932), in the Paul-Boncour ministry (18 December 1932 - 28 January 1933).

1932 Re-elected deputy for Ain, constituency of Nantua-Gex.

1933 Death in Paris (30 October). National funeral, burial in the Pantheon (4 November).

Paul Painlevé was born in Paris in 1863 into a rising middle class family. Initially a designer lithographer, his father had become the owner of a printing ink factory which provided him with a comfortable income. From a Catholic tradition, Paul's parents had received the sacrament of marriage and had their children baptised. However, the father distanced himself from the Church and stopped practicing. Under the Empire, he also asserted his republicanism.

Intellectually precocious, young Paul had been encouraged by his master to enter a lycée. In the Lycée Saint-Louis and then in the Lycée Louis-le-Grand, he was rewarded with a harvest of prizes. Those who aspired to become a "scientist" turned to the École normale supérieure (ENS), which had become the centre of scientific education in France. When he joined the ENS in 1883, he displayed his atheism. Exempted from military service like all normaliens of his time, the brilliant student obtained a double bachelor degree in mathematics and physics. After being received at the aggregation of mathematics, he prepared, in 1887-1888, at the University of Göttingen but under the supervision of Emile Picard, a thesis "Sur les lignes singulières des fonctions mathématiques". A highly cultivated intellectual, he immersed himself in German literature and music. When the Schnaebelé Affair broke out, he was shocked by the vigour of nationalism and militarism across the Rhine. [Note by EFR: Guillaume Schnaebelé, a French police inspector, was arrested by the Germans in April 1887 in an incident which nearly led to war.]

Upon his return to France, the young doctor, whose thesis was hailed as innovative, was appointed lecturer at the Faculty of Science in Lille. For his new research, the Academy of Sciences awarded him prizes. In the early 1890s, Painlevé, who had a real passion for writing, considered abandoning mathematics to devote himself to poetry and prose. In the absence of real encouragement, he gave up the idea particularly when his scientific career accelerated. After being appointed lecturer at the Sorbonne and tutor at the École Polytechnique, he became a professor in these two institutions. In the meantime, in 1900, he had been admitted to the Academy of Sciences. In 1901, the marriage to Marguerite Petit de Villeneuve crowned his social ascent. His wife died the following year, a few days after Jean's birth. Paul Painlevé's sister being a widow herself, the mathematician and his son now lived with her. Faced with mourning, Painlevé could also count on his scientific friends: around Paul Appell, he was part of a brilliant inner circle.

The fight to defend Alfred Dreyfus tightened ties. [Note by EFR: In December 1894 Drefus was convicted of treason in a deliberate miscarriage of justice prompted by anti-Semitism.] In 1899, Painlevé's testimony at the Rennes court martial had been noticed: he had intervened as an insurgent citizen that his statements had been manipulated to make them prosecution evidence against Dreyfus, also as an academic denouncing the Bertillon [handwriting] system as a sham. Until the pardon of 1906, Painlevé, who had joined the League for Human Rights (since 1904, he was on its central committee) faithfully supported Dreyfus. Beginning in 1908, the professor, who was now focusing on fluid mechanics, became involved in the early stages of aviation. Unlike the elegant crowds who crowded around the airfields to salute the pilots' sporting exploits, Painlevé attended the flights to appreciate the competing techniques. With the double record for the longest two-person flight and the flight on two different planes since he had been a passenger for Wilbur Wright and then for Henry Farman, Painlevé could count on the support of headlines with big circulation. He multiplied articles, conferences and contributions to military collective works (For aviation, Triumphant aviation, The airplane for all). L'Aviation, which he wrote in collaboration with Émile Borel, was a bookstore success. Supporting the views of Clement Ader, Painlevé painted a visionary picture of the military uses of the airplane: observation, hunting, bombing and troop transport. His project of the National Aviation Laboratory presented to parliamentarians led to the creation of the Aerotechnical Institute of Saint-Cyr. Painlevé, founder of the École supérieure d'Aéronautique and of the journal La technique aéronautique, was also a member of the French Air Navigation Society and the National Aviation League. The military aviation project commissioned by the chairman of the Budget Committee of the Chamber of Deputies led to the vote on the first military credits for aviation. Painlevé was now a notable person known to the general public.

In 1910, although he was not registered with a party, he was a candidate for deputyship, in Paris, in the 5th arrondissement. His centre-left programme secured him the support of the Radical Party, the Democratic Republican Alliance, and the second round of the SFIO [Note. SFIO is the French Section of the Workers' International]. Elected on his first electoral attempt, Painlevé joined the Republican Socialist parliamentary group and then founded the party of the same name. Reporter of the Navy Budget in 1911 and 1912, he declared himself in favour of a reformed training at the Navy School, he sought to end the monopoly of manufacturing gun powder by state factories, supported the adoption of a fleet of battleships equipped with large calibre guns, and the development of submarines and aviation. Ambitious, Painlevé did not want to be just a technical deputy. He also intervened in the great political debates of the legislature, in particular on the Three Years Law [Note: This was a French law of 1913 increasing military service from two to three years to prepare for a possible was with Germany]. Trying to reconcile the positions of the two camps, he proposed an alternative plan to maintain the workforce: the service lasted only two years, but the recruitment took place at age twenty (retained in the law passed); colonial troops were developed.

When the war broke out, Painlevé had been re-elected deputy for Paris. His notoriety, at the same time his rare competences in the Parliament and his position on the political chessboard, enabled him to play a major role. Chairman of the Navy Commission and the Aeronautics Subcommittee of the War Commission, Painlevé was active in these bodies, where most of the parliamentary work was now carried out. In addition, very committed as president of the higher commission of inventions relating to the national defence, he mobilised scientists and engineers charged with inventing modern warfare. In 1914 and 1915, Painlevé was always more familiar with questions of strategy and tactics, while he rubbed shoulders with members of the executive such as senior military officials. In the autumn of 1915, he obtained his first portfolio in Briand's Cabinet - Public Instruction, Fine Arts and Inventions of National Defence [Note: This was Aristide Briand's 5th Government from 29 October 1915 to 12 December 1916]. Convinced of the importance of innovation for the outcome of the conflict, he devoted himself mainly to this dossier until December 1916.

When the cabinet reshuffle took place, Painlevé refused the War Ministry on the grounds that he did not want to see Nivelle become commander-in-chief [Note: Robert Nivelle was an artillery officer]. In the spring of 1917, the constitution of the Ribot government offered him a new opportunity to access rue Saint-Dominique. The parliamentarians, who criticised Lyautey for his methods [Hubert Lyautey, an army general, was briefly Minister of War] - in particular his refusal to testify even in secret committee - hoped that Painlevé, in accordance with the convictions he had expressed in parliamentary committees, would better respect the rights of Parliament. Armed with the confidence shown in him by the Assemblies, Painlevé was twice Minister of War in 1917, first in the Ribot government (March 20-September 11), then in the short-lived first Cabinet Painlevé (13 September-13 November).

Painlevé was immediately appointed and faced the impending start of the Chemin des Dames operation [The Chemin des Dames is an east-to-west ridge located to the north of Paris]. The new minister consulted before deciding. Certain generals, including Pétain, doubted the advisability of launching a strategic offensive. Given the hope aroused at the front and behind by the publicity made for a vast operation likely to put an end to the war, most of the Ribot government and the President of the Republic considered it unthinkable to back down. Isolated within the executive, Painlevé had to resolve to accept the launching of the operation on 16 April. Although he was aware of the difficulties encountered, he did not interfere in its development. The letters and notes received in quantity by the minister betrayed the despair that had gripped the front. The influential Adolphe Messimy, a real fighter, asked Painlevé to stop the offensive and consider a reshuffle of the commander-in-chief. As the facts had proven him right, Painlevé had more weight in the executive. He threatened to resign if he was unable to exercise full leadership of the war. To avoid triggering a political crisis, Nivelle's last supporters gave in. In order not to appear to disown the chief and the plan for which so many sacrifices had been made, Painlevé planned a reshuffle in two stages. Initially, Nivelle remained general-in-chief while Pétain was appointed chief of staff; a fortnight later, Pétain replaced him as general-in-chief, Foch succeeding him as chief of staff.

By choosing to bring Pétain to the head of operations, Painlevé prompted a change in strategy and tactics. The urgency seemed all the greater since, for the first time since the start of the war, mutinies taking the form of collective indiscipline broke out on the French front. Painlevé refused to restore the courts martial which had been suppressed in April 1916. In view of the threats weighing on the western front, he accepted, however, that the procedures in force in the "ordinary" councils of war would be modified from June. The preliminary investigation was abolished, as were the appeals for review of crimes against the military. Faced with the President of the Republic, a supporter of firmness, Painlevé advocated leniency. At the end of June, when the situation had improved, the Minister of War asked the general-in-chief to no longer use the new powers conferred. The decree of July 13 restored the appeal for review. Although the collective memory retains the image of a spring marked by the bloodiest repression, the number of executions for collective acts - less than thirty - was much more limited than in 1914.

In the early summer of 1917, Painlevé, who encouraged Pétain to implement his "healing policy", undertook to popularise it among parliamentarians. From now on, the offensives would no longer be designed on the sacrifice of the infantry, but based on the use of artillery, aviation and tanks. According to this conception, an enormous production of modern war material, in particular of tanks and advanced combat planes, was launched in the second half of the year 1917. This material was to be operational at the time of the resumption of the great strategic offensives set for 1918 when the cohorts of American soldiers landed. For the time being, the army was adopting an essentially defensive attitude. Three operations of "convalescence" or "precision" - the French contribution to the allied offensive in Flanders, the restoration of the north defensive system in Verdun, the attack of the fort of Malmaison - which had started with a massive engagement of artillery, the use of tanks and aviation, concluded with local successes. They gave confidence to the combatants by showing them that an attack, however difficult it was, could succeed provided that it was well prepared. The soldiers also appreciated the improvement in their living conditions, particularly meals, rest times and the development of military cooperatives. Painlevé also put pressure on the general-in-chief so that the duration of leave was increased. Pétain, who faced a staffing crisis, finally gave in: from October 1, soldiers were no longer entitled to only 7, but to 10 days of leave every 4 months. Painlevé also negotiated with the general-in-chief the institution of war correspondents: the press could now send journalists to the front. Finally, the Minister of War obtained that the controllers of the Army Commission had a general and permanent right of control allowing them to also go onto the line of fire.

The combined management of the war and the development of the other European fronts also mobilised the Minister for War. Painlevé wanted massive aid from the United States, which entered the war against Germany on 6 April. The mission led by Viviani and Joffre on American soil made it possible to decide on the forms of Franco-American military cooperation. Painlevé took part in the demonstrations organised to celebrate the arrival of the 1st DIUS [United States Infantry Division] on French soil. The Minister of War had in fact lent himself to an effective political communication since April intended to praise a collaboration presented as an echo of La Fayette's aid to the Americans. The preparation of the massive landings planned for 1918 was closely followed by Painlevé during the summer and autumn of 1917. In addition to hope from across the Atlantic, the Minister of War was faced with the precariousness of the Russian alliance. Quickly convinced of a probable collapse of the eastern front, Painlevé sought to gain time before a surplus of German troops poured into the western front. He sent multiple messages of support for the Kerenski government and, with the British, lobbied for the continuation of the great Russian summer offensive. Well-informed of the evolution of this front by French personnel dispatched to Russia, Painlevé was also confronted with the mutiny of Russian fighters stationed in France. In mid-September, the French Minister of War engaged French troops alongside Russian soldiers who remained loyal to the Provisional Government. Their mission: to liberate the Courtine camp, which was soon to house American soldiers. In addition, the Minister of War supported, during the year 1917, the creation of a Polish army then of a Czech army in France, whose manpower, although certainly small, would constitute an auxiliary force for the Entente. Unlike the President of the Republic, who was in favour of a victorious peace for broad war aims, Painlevé was in favour of a negotiated peace satisfying objectives limited to the restitution of Alsace and the Moselle. From then on, the Minister of War authorised the "Armand-Revertera" and "Briand-Lancken" peace talks in that direction, the first from Austria-Hungary, the second from Germany. When Italy suffered the defeat of the Battle of Caporetto in the autumn of 1917, Painlevé convinced the British to come to the aid of the peninsula. In return, the Allies demanded a reorganisation of the Italian high command. At the Rapallo conference, Painlevé also carried out his project for a superior allied war council. Foch was appointed to represent France there. An essential step was taken towards the establishment of a single command.

The Minister of War was also to decide in 1917 on the situation in the East. Favourable to the dismissal of the Germanophile Constantine of Greece, he ended up winning the agreement of the British who were initially very reluctant to see the fall of a monarchy. With General Sarrail who commanded Allied operations in the East, Painlevé organised a landing in Attica; the new Greek government went to war against the Triple Alliance. Painlevé, who had been close to General Sarrail for a long time, supported him despite criticism from the British: they blamed him for his lack of transparency and his conduct of operations. The fall of the Painlevé cabinet in mid-November led to the fall of his protégé.

The first Painlevé government was the most ephemeral of the war (13 September - 13 November 1917) and the only one to fall on a vote of no confidence. Although the Minister of War had not changed the way he led the war, which had previously guaranteed him his success in parliament, he faced growing multifaceted opposition. His cabinet suffered from not having unified socialists: their parliamentary group had broken the sacred government union on the grounds that Ribot, whom he still criticised for not having allowed passports to be issued to go to Stockholm for the peace conference, was maintained at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, the positions adopted by the Painlevé government on questions of pacifism and treason were sometimes denounced by the left which reproached it for its too great firmness, sometimes by the right which rebelled against its laxity.

During the two years following the fall of his first ministry, Painlevé stood back from political life. Thanks to a highly publicised campaign for the legislative elections of 1919, he defended his record as Minister of War. From his point of view, he had with Pétain programmed and prepared the resumption of the strategic offensives for 1918; Clemenceau had been crowned with a victory that France also owed him. Painlevé was re-elected a member of the opposition in the days of the National Bloc. The League of the Republic he led called the left to unite for the legislative elections of 1924. A pioneer of the Cartel, Painlevé was one of the leaders. President of the Chamber of Deputies, candidate for the Left, unique but unhappy, in the presidential election of 1924, he firmly supported the new majority. In 1925 it chose him to succeed Herriot as President of the Council.

The second Painlevé government (17 April - 28 October 1925) became entangled in the financial crisis. The majority of cartelists, on the other hand, praised the choice of the Painlevé / Briand pair (Minister of Foreign Affairs) to pursue the path of Franco-German rapprochement, soon leading to the signing of the Locarno Agreements and the admission of Germany to the League of Nations. The War, which Painlevé had chosen to lead again, had become a crisis ministry. France faced the first post-war colonial revolts. In Morocco, Painlevé entrusted Pétain with the management of operations against Abd el-Krim's troops. Sarrail was responsible for restoring order in Syria and Lebanon. The uprisings were fought with modern means (use of artillery and aerial bombardment).

If in his third government (29 October - 22 November 1925) Painlevé was exceptionally responsible for finance, he then held, until the end of 1929 and six more times, the War portfolio. His participation in the National Union was perceived by the far left as a shift to the right. Painlevé justified his choice on the grounds that it was necessary, as in the time of war, to unite to save the country when in danger. He was also motivated by his desire to carry out the military reform projects that the development of diplomatic relations with Germany made possible. He first carried the laws of 1927 and 1928 on general organisation, the frameworks and manpower and finally the recruitment to the Army. The one-year service was the keystone of the plan. The result was a set of measures intended to ensure national defence through the redeployment of military and civilian personnel employed by the Army, the "industrialisation" of its services and the permanent modernisation of its equipment. In addition, Painlevé ensured the technical and budgetary preparation of the defensive border system. The final title of the work was due to the fact that André Maginot was running rue Saint-Dominique at the end of 1929 when the credits necessary for its realisation were voted. The myth of collective security would not stand the test of events. A large number of provisions supposed to compensate for the reduction in the duration of military service could not be carried out as soon as the credits were cut in the 1930s. Besides the fact that the so-called Maginot line only constituted an effective barrier on a small part of the border, the system was not redesigned to adapt to the rise in dangers and was also subjected, for budgetary reasons, also to modifications which made it even more vulnerable.

Painlevé was not responsible for these developments, since he completed his ministerial career in the early 1930s as Minister of Air (three times between December 1930 and January 1933). This portfolio, certainly less prestigious than that of the War, allowed him to reconnect with his passion of the 1910s.

Here as there, Painlevé continued the modernisation of National Defence. When he succeeded Painlevé, Pierre Cot completed the reform leading to the empowerment of the Air Force.

At that time, Painlevé kept warning of the rise of Nazism. In January 1933, when he had been sick for several weeks and was only exercising his mandate as a deputy, he vigorously denounced the accession of Hitler to power. Very diminished, he supported organisations helping German refugees. He died in October 1933. Parliament, which wished to salute the dual career of the scientist and the politician, voted for a national funeral and an interment in the Pantheon. The Communists, who criticised Painlevé for the repression of the mutinies in 1917 and the crushing of the colonial revolts in 1925, were the only ones to vote against this exceptional tribute.

Before the war, an early parliamentary specialist on defence issues

Elected in 1910 deputy for Paris, registered with the group of socialist republicans, the mathematician Paul Painlevé shows from the tenth legislature a particular interest for the technical questions in connection with the field of Defence. His positions on the future role of aviation or the reforms to be undertaken in the Navy quickly made him emerge as a deputy who was a specialist in military matters. As rapporteur for the Marine Budget, he called for a modernisation of the French fleet: equipment in battleships armed with longer range guns, development of submarines and on-board aviation. As several very serious accidents had taken place aboard ships whose gun-powder had exploded, Painlevé also demanded that the public monopoly for the manufacture of gun powder and explosives in France should disappear. He also called for a reform of the training of naval officers.

Deputy technician specialised in military matters, Paul Painlevé also between 1910 and 1914 wore a second cap, that of the emerging parliamentarian capable of taking a stand in the great debates of the legislature. His intervention in the debate on the Three Years Law summed up his position. In 1913, vigorously opposed to the government project, he proposed an alternative providing for lowering the age of conscription to twenty, recruiting more soldiers from the colonies, and modernising the equipment of the army, in particular to speed up the deployment of aviation. His first suggestion was retained in the law finally passed.

1914-1915, the war at the head of commissions: a political springboard

When war was declared, Paul Painlevé, 51, was not mobilised. He lived in Paris and split his time between two types of activities.

On the one hand, he worked for two of the most important committees of the House, the War Commission and the War Navy Commission responsible for controlling the executive and making proposals to it. In these commissions, Painlevé took up dossiers on which he could use his scientific skills. Faced with his peers and during the hearings of directors or ministers, he intervened in particular on gun powder and explosives, on submarines or on aviation. As president of the Navy, he did not hesitate to undertake a real showdown with the minister over the Dardanelles expedition over which parliamentarians wished to be able to exercise real control.

On the other hand, Painlevé headed the Higher Commission for Inventions Relating to National Defence. This commission, created in August 1914 and attached to the Ministry of War, was initially chaired by the mathematician Paul Appell, chosen because he was then president of the Academy of Sciences. As vice-president, Paul Painlevé chaired the 3rd section of the commission, that devoted to the Mechanical Arts, Aeronautics, Engines and Ballistics. Paul Appell preferring to invest in the chairmanship of the National Rescue Committee helping the civilian victims of the war, Painlevé replaced him at the head of the Higher Commission for Inventions. President de facto, if not the title holder, Painlevé fully invested in this function in 1914 and 1915.

Initially, the commission was responsible for selecting the proposals for inventions addressed to the State - 10,000 received between 1914 and 1915. Very quickly, under the drive of Painlevé, it carried out experiments and launched applied research programmes. The learned deputy did not himself carry out experiments or research; on the other hand, he played a very active role in coordinating research and managing the work carried out by the other scientists working for the commission. He spoke with the Minister and the military to obtain the assignment of technicians, laboratory assistants, engineers or mobilised scientists, or to make military equipment or land available for experiments or tests.

With these new human and material resources, the commission considerably increased its field of action. Research programmes aimed to renovate the firing tables, listen to underground noises to react to mine warfare, build motorised assault vehicles, equip planes with sights, machine guns and bombs, improve submarines, create filtration systems to ward off gas, etc. Given the stagnation of the conflict and the new nature of total war, the Commission for Inventions quickly seemed essential. But Painlevé's hopes were dashed, not only because the means be required were not all been obtained, but also because rivalries with the military hampered in his eyes the progress of research. Painlevé called for reform of the policy of inventions.

1915-1916, a tailor-made first ministry: Public Instruction, Fine Arts and Inventions of National Defence

In the autumn of 1915, Painlevé, who had been considered for ministerial duties for several weeks, negotiated a tailor-made portfolio in the Briand cabinet: the Ministry of Public Instruction, Fine Arts and Inventions of National Defence. At the head of this ministry between the autumn of 1915 and the autumn of 1916, Painlevé put all his energy into promoting the policy of inventions. In the eyes of the public, he now officially embodied "The Scientific War". Painlevé immediately instituted a department of inventions within his department. To take account of the changing nature of the fighting, its organisation was much more complex than that of the Commission for Inventions. It now has eight technical sections designed to reflect the new nature of the conflict: "Physics and electricity", "Ballistics and weapons", "Chemistry", "Trench warfare", "Mechanics", "Aeronautics", "Marine", and "Hygiene and physiology ".

At the head of the management, Painlevé put in place a technical cabinet made up of fellow academics: mathematicians like Émile Borel, physicists like Jean Perrin, Charles Maurin and André Debierne, and a physiologist like Louis Lapicque. These people, who had participated in applied research operations since 1914, were responsible for overseeing the policy of inventions. Also exercising a technological watch function, they had to quickly study the inventions deemed most interesting to the state at war. The Patent Commission was there to sort out the patents filed. It transmitted to the technical cabinet those which it considers the most interesting. The government had a right of first refusal on all inventions proposed to management and a right of scrutiny over all the work carried out by other structures, in particular by the higher committee. Once the sorting has been carried out by the technical body, its members sent the most interesting inventions to the technical sections. Painlevé finally negotiated with the Allies so that interallied cooperation was henceforth instituted on the dossier of inventions, hence the creation of an interallied committee. Management was expanding its scope of action and recruiting new employees.

Painlevé succeeded in giving war science new resources, but he was not satisfied with the way the war was led, with the strategic options chosen by the high command. When the cabinet reshuffle took place in the fall of 1916, Painlevé refused the War Ministry on the grounds that he did not want to see Nivelle become commander-in-chief. Painlevé then put himself in reserve for the Republic.

The Ministry of War: the challenges of the year 1917

The ministerial reshuffle in the spring of 1917 led Painlevé to accede to the Ministry of War. The appointment of Alexandre Ribot convinced him that he could now influence strategic choices. Parliamentarians, concerned that the rights of Parliament were respected, showed their satisfaction that a civilian, in addition a member reputed to have fought in this direction between 1914 and 1915, led the rue Saint-Dominique.

As Minister of War in the Ribot government (20 March - 11 September 1917), Painlevé faced a particularly complicated situation. He opposed the so-called Chemin des Dames offensive. But the intense propaganda in favour of the attack has raised much hope in the country. Painlevé was also politically weak in a government influenced by Nivelle's supporters. The President of the Republic, Raymond Poincaré, used his influence to carry the decision in favour of its launch. The 16 April was a human disaster and a military failure that allowed Painlevé to be listened to from that time on in the executive. He threatened to resign if he was unable to exercise full leadership of the war. To avoid triggering a political crisis, Nivelle's last supporters gave in. In order not to appear to disown the chief and the plan for which so many sacrifices were made, Painlevé planed a reshuffle in two stages. First Nivelle remained as general-in-chief while Pétain was appointed chief of the general staff of the armies. Fifteen days later, he became Commander-in-Chief in place of Nivelle, Foch succeeding Pétain as Chief of the General Staff.

More than a change of man, it was a change of strategy and tactics which was then initiated. The urgency was all the greater as there was rage on the French front of mutinies, a movement of collective indiscipline, which put it in danger. Painlevé refused to restore the court martial which had been suppressed in April 1916. In view of the threats hanging over the western front, he accepted however that the procedures in force in the "ordinary" councils of war would be modified from the month of June. The preliminary investigation was abolished, as well as the appeals for review for crimes against the military. Faced with the President of the Republic, a supporter of firmness, Painlevé advocated leniency. At the end of June, when the situation improved, the Minister of War asked the general-in-chief to stop using the new powers conferred. The decree of July 13 restored the appeal for a review. Although the collective memory retains the image of a spring marked by bloody repression, the number of executions for collective acts - less than thirty - was much more limited than in 1914.

After suppressing the mutinies, Painlevé and Pétain began a "healing policy" to improve the lives of soldiers at the front and their morale. From then on, the offensives would no longer be designed on the sacrifice of the infantry, but based on the use of artillery, aviation and tanks. According to this conception, an enormous production of modern war material, in particular of tanks and advanced combat planes, was launched in the second half of the year 1917. This material had to be operational by the time of the resumption of the great strategic offensives set for 1918 when the cohorts of American soldiers landed. For the time being, the army had adopted an essentially defensive attitude. Three operations of "convalescence" or "precision" - French contribution to the allied offensive in Flanders, the restoration of the north defensive system in Verdun, the attack of the fort of Malmaison - which began with a massive engagement of artillery, the use of tanks and aviation ended with local successes. They gave confidence to the combatants by showing them that an attack, however difficult it may be, can succeed if one is well prepared. The soldiers also appreciated the improvement in their living conditions, particularly with regard to meals, rest times and the development of military cooperatives. Painlevé also lobbied the general-in-chief so that the duration of leaves was increased. Pétain, who faced a staffing crisis, finally gave in: from 1 October, soldiers would no longer be entitled to only 7, but to 10 days of leave every 4 months. Painlevé also negotiated with the general-in-chief the institution of war correspondents: the press could now send journalists to the front. Finally, the Minister of War obtained for the controllers of the Army Commission a general and permanent right of control allowing them to also go into the line of fire.

The combined management of the war and the development of the other European fronts also mobilised the Minister of War. Painlevé was seeking massive aid from the United States, which entered the war against Germany on 6 April. The mission led by Viviani and Joffre on American soil made it possible to decide on the forms of Franco-American military cooperation. Painlevé took part in the demonstrations organised to celebrate the arrival of the 1st United States Infantry Division on French soil. The Minister of War has in fact been lending since April an effective political communication intended to praise a collaboration presented as an echo of La Fayette's aid to the Americans. The preparation of the massive landings planned for 1918 was closely followed by Painlevé during the summer and autumn of 1917. In parallel with hope from across the Atlantic, the Minister of War was confronted with the precariousness of the Russian alliance. Quickly convinced of a probable collapse of the eastern front, Painlevé sought to gain time before a surplus of German troops arrived on the western front. He sent multiple messages of support for the Kerenski government and, with the British, pressed for the continuation of the great Russian summer offensive. Well informed of the evolution of this front by French personnel dispatched to Russia, Painlevé was also confronted with the mutiny of Russian fighters stationed in France. In mid-September, the French Minister of War hired French troops alongside Russian soldiers who remained loyal to the Provisional Government. Their mission: quell the rebellion of Russians to win the Bolshevik cause, then liberate the Courtine camp intended to soon house American soldiers. In addition, the Minister of War supported, during the year 1917, the creation of a Polish army then of a Czech army in France, whose manpower, certainly small, would constitute an auxiliary force for the Entente.

Unlike the President of the Republic who was in favour of a victorious peace for broad war aims, Painlevé was in favour of a negotiated peace satisfying objectives limited to the restitution of Alsace and the Moselle. Consequently, the Minister of War authorised in 1917 the peace talks "Armand-Revertera" and "Briand-Lancken" to take place, the first from Austria-Hungary, the second from Germany.

The Minister of War was also to pronounce in 1917 on the situation in the East. Favourable to the dismissal of the German supporting king Constantine of Greece, he ended up winning the agreement of the British who initially were very reluctant to see fall a monarchy. Painlevé entrusted General Sarrail, who commanded Allied operations in the Orient, with the organisation of a landing in Attica. The new Greek government went to war against the Triple Alliance.

A first but short-lived presidency of the Council in the autumn of 1917

On the strength of his political successes in the summer of 1917, of his management of the mutinies, of Pétain's reforms to restore lasting calm in the trenches, of preparations for the resumption of the great offensives, of new military victories on the French front, of Greece entering the war in the Allied camp, Painlevé was appointed President of the Council in September. He had, it is true, benefited until then from a form of state of grace which led Clemenceau to spare him from the limelight as in the columns of the newspaper L'Homme enchaîné. The difficulties encountered by General Sarrail on the Eastern Front or the tensions with the British ally on the question of manpower seemed secondary in view of the rest of the balance sheet of the Minister of War.

When Italy suffered in the autumn of 1917, the defeat of Caporetto, Painlevé, who remained Minister of War, convinced the British to come to the aid of the peninsula. In return, the Allies negotiate a reorganization of the Italian high command. At the Rapallo conference, Painlevé also completed his plan for a high allied war council. Foch was appointed to represent France there. An essential step had been taken towards the establishment of a single command.

Although the Minister of War did not change his methods of directing the war, he faced growing multifaceted opposition. His cabinet suffered from not having unified socialists: their parliamentary group has broken the sacred government union on the grounds that Ribot, whom he still accused of not having allowed passports to go to Stockholm at the peace conference, was maintained at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, the positions adopted by the Painlevé government on questions of pacifism and betrayal are sometimes denounced by the left which reproaches it for being too firm, sometimes by the right which rebels against its laxity. The first Painlevé government proved to be the most ephemeral of the war (13 September -13 November 1917) and the only one to fall on a vote of no confidence.

Post-war or lessons from the First World War

Until the armistice, Painlevé stood in reserve for the Republic. After the war, he chose not to give up politics, on the contrary, until his death in 1933, he occupied a prominent place as a specialist on defence issues and as a leader of the left.

In tune with the majority of public opinion, Painlevé then presented himself as a pacifist. A supporter of legal pacifism, he encouraged the action of the League of Nations, which set up processes to resolve the differences between states by discussion. His presidencies of the Council in 1925 were thus marked by the signing of the Locarno Agreements which guaranteed the borders between France and Germany and the admission of Germany to the League of Nations as a permanent member of its council. He was also appointed to chair the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations, responsible for bringing together the elites in particular.

Painlevé was not, however, any more than before the war, a defender of integral pacifism which would lead him to call for total disarmament. France must not be the aggressor, but in the event of aggression it must be able to defend itself. Thus, as Minister of War, he voted to reduce the length of military service to one year (1928). At the same time, he led the discussions on the route and the type of fortifications to protect the borders of France, a system which will soon be called the Maginot Line (Painlevé has just left power when the project was submitted to deputies; André Maginot who succeeded him at the Ministry of War presented it to Parliament).

In addition to these advances to guarantee peace in Europe, Painlevé was also the Minister of War who, in 1925 and 1926, led the repression of colonial revolts in Morocco, Syria and Lebanon. He considered that the revolts were an aggression against France. As such, Painlevé decided to intensify the repression in Morocco. Appointed by Painlevé commander-in-chief of the troops in Morocco, Pétain decided to use the most modern means in the Rif (a mountainous region in the northern part of Morocco), in particular to carry out bombardments by plane. The same repressive policy was carried out in Syria and in Lebanon by General Sarrail.

In 1933, the Communists remembered his responsibility in the repression of the mutinies of 1917 as in those of the colonial uprisings. As such, they refused to vote for his state funeral and his pantheonisation.