Quotes from Zinger's philosophical papers


The first series of quotes given below is from Vasily Yakovlevich Zinger, Exact sciences and positivism (Moscow University, Moscow, 1874). This talk was delivered at the ceremonial meeting of the Imperial Moscow University on 12 January 1874.

The second series of quotes is from Vasily Yakovlevich Zinger, Misunderstandings in Views on the Foundations of Geometry (Moscow, 1894). Zinger delivered this work at the IX Congress of Russian Natural Scientists and Physicians in Moscow in January 1894. In it Zinger examines the views of various scientists on the foundations of geometry and expresses the opinion that the reliability, certainty, and accuracy of these foundations cannot be demonstrated if one relies on empiricism, that is, if one recognises sensory experience as the only source of knowledge. Empiricism, according to Zinger, can rather destroy these foundations, since they have an ideal, a priori character, independent of experience, representing in a certain sense the integral qualities of the human capacity for contemplation.

1. Zinger and Positivism
1.1.
Positivism is a trend in philosophy of the 19th-20th centuries that declares concrete (empirical) sciences to be the only source of true, actual knowledge and denies the value of all other types of knowledge, primarily religious and philosophical. The founder of positivism was Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who introduced the term "positivism". The Course in Positive Philosophy is a series of texts by Comte published between 1830 and 1842. Zinger criticised the ideas of positivism calling it pseudo-philosophical and degrading the dignity of man by denying his spiritual nature. It was a brave step to take since positivism was widely recognised by scientists.

1.2.
This fundamental position of positivism cannot be recognised in an unconditional sense: in essence, behind it is hidden, like a silent postulate, the recognition of the power of reason, without which experience could not teach anything and would even be completely impossible.

1.3.
Positivists recognise the exact and experimental sciences as the main basis of their teaching; but their attitude to these sciences reveals only a complete disregard for any true knowledge ... positivism is not distinguished by either depth or wit and as a philosophical teaching does not present any attractiveness.

1.4.
Cognition is the result of reflection, the result of the efforts of reason. In the matter of thought and science, the existence of reason is the fundamental, original fact, which cannot be doubted without contradiction. ... Reason in its various manifestations is a constantly and everywhere active faculty of man: its participation is inherent in every step we take, and much that we, out of habit and as a result of extreme unusualness, are inclined to consider as a direct indication of feeling or instinct, in reality turns out to be the work of reason. Even the very possibility of experience, the possibility of any sensory perception, necessarily presupposes the existence of reason, without which we, having eyes, would be blind and, having ears, would be deaf.

1.5.
Everything that is studied in the exact sciences has an undoubted and sharply expressed character of ideality; in the world of mathematical concepts, everything is reduced to ideal simplicity, whether these are objects created by thought itself, or objects introduced into the field by means of external perceptions.

1.6.
... idealisation is a constant and necessary activity of the mind, applied by it in every transfer of any content in the realm of thought. The formation of ideas and concepts as materials for logical processing, for the deduction of truths that constitute knowledge, is necessarily accompanied by this preliminary preparation. In this regard, there is no difference between a priori and empirical concepts; the difference in origin has an influence, and a very significant one, but in a different respect.
2. Report of the 1894 Congress of Russian Natural Scientists and Physicians
The 9th Congress of Naturalists and Physicians was held in Moscow from January 3 to 11, 1894, under the chairmanship of K A Timiryazev. During the general session on January 11, Tolstoy entered the hall. The writer sat next to the chairman of the congress, K A Timiryazev, and listened to the speech of the mathematician V Ya Zinger, "Misunderstandings in Views on the Foundations of Geometry"; the topic was chosen in connection with the anniversary of N I Lobachevsky, whom Tolstoy remembered as the rector of Kazan University, where the future writer studied.

Of course, Tolstoy could not remain unnoticed, and he had to take a seat next to the chairman to a stormy ovation from those present. In the evening, Tolstoy reproached the young Zinger: "And what did you say about there being no parade? Such a gulf of people, all in tailcoats and all clearly "birthday boys"... This is no longer a "festival of science", but some kind of scholarly Maslenitsa [an ancient Orthodox Christian holiday] ... And tell me, why is it that when they proposed the thanks to Kapnist, the students hissed, but applauded Stoletov so loudly?" ... - the writer was interested. And he continued his thought: "It's a pity I didn't hear Vasily Yakovlevich Stoletov's speech from the beginning. I liked it at the end: "not only the light from the window".

During the break in the meeting, Tolstoy talked with the physiologist I M Sechenov.

The Russian press the next day noted Tolstoy's presence at the congress; the newspaper "Russkie Vedomosti", on whose editorial board there were many teachers and students of Moscow University, covered it in detail. The astronomer K D Pokrovsky wrote about this vividly, brightly and figuratively to his friend S V Shcherbakov: "Yesterday at a general meeting on the stage in the first row sat two counts: 1) Count Kapnist and 2) Count Leo Tolstoy. The first was, of course, in a tailcoat, under which a red ribbon was flaunted on his white chest, the second in trousers and a blouse, belted with a narrow belt. The first one, although accidentally, was rather effectively hissed, the second one was met with a terrible thunder of applause."

2.1

If misunderstandings and errors are possible even in such a simple area of ​​knowledge as the mathematical sciences, then in the vast, extremely diverse and complex area of ​​natural science, there is undoubtedly even more danger of falling on the wrong path of incorrect conclusions and illegal generalisations. In this area, where experience provides both material for scientific research and a means for checking hypotheses and theoretical conclusions, where the depth of the idea, wit and skill in producing the experiment constitute the high intellectual pleasure of the natural scientist and often his glory, in this area the pernicious views of empiricism most often penetrate, which, humiliating the dignity of man by denying his spiritual nature, strives to make him a slave of matter. For any impartial thinking person, empiricism is refuted by strictly logical proofs, but the moral sense is even more indignant against it, since the denial of spiritual existence destroys the only solid support of morality and suppresses all the highest ideal aspirations of man.

2.2
Science and true knowledge must not be slaves to experience, they must dominate it and make it serve their purposes. It is true that science must be guided not by material but by ideal aspirations, but it is even truer that it is based not on material but on ideal principles. The highest qualities of science are clarity, simplicity, sincerity and conscientiousness of thought; the torch of science is the ideal of truth. But science is only one side of the spiritual being and life of man; the same ideal of truth appears from other sides, sometimes as the ideal of beauty and harmony, sometimes as the ideal of goodness and honour, truth and philanthropy; it is one and the same ideal, - the one before which we all, without distinction of age and position, without distinction of views and convictions, without distinction of merits and talents, reverently bow down, as before the ideal of divine wisdom and love!

2.3
Experimental data in themselves, due to the inevitable lack of precision, are so malleable that they can always be adapted to non-Euclidean and any other geometry, and from this it is revealed with even greater clarity that the reliability of axioms can neither be confirmed nor refuted by means of experimental verification.

2.4
The best evidence of the heterogeneity of speculative and experimental objects of knowledge can be the fact that in scientific language there is no word expressing a concept so unclear and indefinable as the word "substance" and "matter", and yet this word is essential for expressing the perception of precisely that alien element that is introduced into our consciousness through external experience.

2.5
Axioms, by their very concept, as original truths, cannot themselves be substantiated purely logically; for their recognition, some other basis must exist; in this case, this basis is immediate evidence... Thus, belief in empirical origin can only destroy geometry, deprive it of reliability, certainty and accuracy, but in no way establish the foundations on which it is based.

2.6
... new mathematical research on manifolds not only did not change, but also could not change the previous foundations of geometry, because they did not touch them at all and could not touch them.

2.7
Experience is a necessary and great means for studying the external world; only it can provide material for natural science, and often it guides the mind in the desire to comprehend natural phenomena. The scientist believed that data obtained through experience could be useful in many aspects: the development of new analytical techniques; the application of the results obtained in various branches of mathematics, etc.

Last Updated June 2025